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The matters discussed by defendants in
their briefp fHed in connection with their
petition for rehearing, are so largely matters
rehashed from the original briefs, and matters which the Court's Opinion indicates has
received its full attention, that counsel for
plaintiffs would have submitted the matter
without brief or argument, except that, perhaps wrongly, we feel it necessary to direct
the attention of the Court to some fallacies in
reasoning here presented. Counsel for defendants have been very persuasive 9 but too
often that persuasiveness has been based upon
faulty concepts or misapprehension of the
testimony.
Defendants divide their arguments under
two headings, the one 11 that there was a conflict in the medical testimony, the other that
the Commission was not arbitrary or capricious in refusing to find as fact the factors which
the doctors assumed in answering the hypothetical questions proposed.
The division is somewhat impractical,
since arbitrariness and capriciousness are
found here in the attitude of the Commission
both as to the medical testimony, and as to
the factual background. In reality~' the argument should be devoted to the following:
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1

Was there conflict or contradiction
either in the medical testimony, or in the
evidence as to factors upon which that medical testimony was based which was of substance
sufficient to prevent the Commission's decision from being capricious or arbitrary.
2

Is it the law, as defendants assume,
that the power of determining what the evidence shows is solely within the field of the
Commission?

ARGUMENT
Point No. 1: No substantial conflict
exists in the evidence.
Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dictionary (1950) defines the words "conflict" and "contradict" as follows:
Conflict:

To strike or dash against;
to meet and oppose; to contend; to fight; to strive or
struggle; to resist or overcome; to be in opposition;
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-3contrary as nthe evidence
given by the second witness
conflicted with that given by
the first. n
Contradict: To oppose by words; to
assert the contrary; to deny;
Syn: Oppose~ gainsays deny,
resist~ impugn, correct,
rectify, retract, recant.
We shall not attempt to rehash at length
matters which already have been covered by
prior briefs, as is the situation with so much
of the matter set out on rehearing. It seems
evident to us that the members of this Court,
in their prolonged and searching study of this
case, must have availed themselves 9 not only
of matters urged in the brief, but also of the
transcript of testimony 9 and that they are
familiar with the full text of what was said,
particularly as to the evidence of the medical
experts.
Defendants cite (Br. on Reh. 8} matter
from the case of
Morris v. Ind. Com., 90 Utah 256
61 P. Zd 413
which in effect gives certain tests which
must be met before the Commission may be
reversed. Some of them, in the absence of
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-4cont~ntion by defendants that they are applicable, require little attention. For there is
no question that the evidence uncontradicted
in this case is not wholly that of interested
witnesses, or from witnesses showing bias
or prejudice 9 and it is not suggested by defendants that the presence of the witnesses, in
the instant case, gave the single member of
the Commission who heard the testimony
such an advantage over the Court that the
Commission's conclusions should not be disturbed. Nor that any other explanation of
hypotheses accounting for Jones' death
appear~.
In effect defendants do argue that:

(a) The evidence is contradicted, (b)
there is matter intrinsically discrediting
the uncontradicted evidence, and (c) the
uncon,tradicted evidence is not such as to
carry a measure of conviction to the reasonable mind and sustain the burden of proof.

The effect of the medical testimony
was argued extensively in the former briefs.
Nothing· new appears in the brief on rehearing, except the argument that the majority
opinion of this Court misconstrued the testimony of Dr. Drew Peterson 11 giving it an
"affirmative" construction rather than a
"negative" one. Also there is a good deal
of quotation from testimony 9 to bolster up
the prior argument that the testimony of Dr.
E. D. Zeman and Dr. J. G. Olson, being
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-5based upon a hypothetical que stion 11 will not
stand if the facts found by the Commission
eliminate the basis upon which the testimony
was given.
We shall not attempt to rep! y to the
purported analysis of various questions and
answers resulting from sparring between
witness and counsel in cross-examination.
We assert that the testimony of these physicians boils down to the opinion that the fati ~
gue, incident to the previous exertion, with
little rest, over at least the two days prior
to July 3rd, plus the exertion of that day p
alone were adequate to support the belief
that the occlusion of which Jones died was
industry connected. We have directed attention in our former brief to the weight which
they gave to such additional factors as heat 9
confined space in which to work, stress
arising from responsibility for the job,
work done in a squatting position and so on.
Neither the majority or minority opinion of
the Court reflects any doubt that the opinion
of these witnesses was that factors present
in Jones• working conditions caused the
occlusion.
They gave an explanation for their
opinion that under these conditions there had
been built up a debt to nature, as Dr. Zeman
points out, which created a physiological
change, as well as built up cumulatively a
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-6condition equivalent to pronounced overwork
and over exertion and that the result was an
anoxia, an insufficient amount of oxygen in
the blood supplyv resulting in increased
heart effort which 9 coupled with the narrowed
arterial condition already existing 9 resulted
in formation of a clot which choked off the
coronary artery and caused death. We would
like to emphasize the findings of the autopsist
made prior to any controversy arising; that
he found no rupture of the blood vesseL nor
any ulceration of the arterial plaques 9 thus
eliminating other possible causes of the
occlusion than the one ascribed by these physicians; and the following significant statement:
"The relationship of the immediate
cause of the occlusion is probably
on the basis of an a:noxia 9 the
mechanism of which is best correlated from the recent clinical his ...
tory or environmental relationship. "

In this case no past clinical history
appeared 9 but the evidence was full of
environmental relationships
The evidence
clearly did not point to any theory or hypothesis, other than the environmental one.
Equally reasonable in explaining the cause
of death.
o

Conflict in the medical testimony,· if
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must be found in the evidence of Dr.
Drew Peterson. The majority opinion
treats this physician as mildly affirming
what his fellow experts said. Defendants
insist somewhat urgently that the Court
should consider Dr. Peterson's evidence
as having a "negative" aspect. We think
the majority opinion makes sense.
Taking that part of his testimony
which defendants quote on page 5 of their
last brief, it is significant that the first
sentence of Dr. Peterson's answer is a
complete statement of his position if, and
if only, he had no opinion one way or the
other on the relationship between working
conditions {and the other factors involved)
and the coronary occlusion- -the position
defendants contend for on his part. But
he did not stop there!
When he went further, he gave an
opinion. He said that there was possibly
a relationship. Taken alone 9 that might
not have meant too much; taken with
what he said previously, it seems to us
to show that he wanted to make it clear
that, in his opinion, the odds favored
the connection of the occlusion with the
various work factors shown in the case.
In effect, he said:
While it is true that there is so much
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-8variation in the authorities that I will not
dogmatically say that such is the fact 9
yet it is my opinion that the coronary came
out of Jones' employment.
He had already fore shadowed this
opinion when he testified {Tr. 199 -200)
that he would warn a man~ whose case history showed chest pains after climbing
stairs and who had hypertension, not to
overexert 9 although he would not tell him,
"If you exert yourself you will have a
coronary thrombosis. " The old saying runs:
"The proof of the pudding is in the eating
thereof. 11 May we paraphrase it by saying
that "what the physician warns against 9 he
fears".
We submit that there was no substantial conflict or contradiction in the medical
testimony.
Defendants less energetically attempt
to indicate some contradiction in the evidence of the lay witnesses as to their observations as to the work conditions 9 and what
they observed as to the decedent's condition.
Upon that (Br. on Reh. 32 et seq.) they contend the Commission was warranted in
reaching the conclusion that Jones suffered
from no unusual strain 9 overexertion 9
fatigue or emotional stress. They point to
minor variances in the testimony to bolster
up their argument. For instance, because
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-9Spencer Porter testified (Tr. 180) that he
talked with Jones on the morning of his death 11
discussing the troubles Jones had in getting
the motor started, without any question
asked or answer given as to his impression
of decedent 1 s condition 11 they would hold the
Commission entitled to conclude that he
suffered no more worry, fatigue, exertion 9
that individuals ordinarily are subject to in
their normal lives.
Of course the testimony of the witnesses varied. The people called were
about their own work much of the time on those
July days a year ago. They testified nearly
six months after the events of which they told.
Obviously they were not coached 9 nor did
they seek to parrot the evidence given by
other witnesses. But through the whole
record 9 from the witnesses who had seen
him at work the day he died 9 who had seen
him at work the day before 9 we get a cumulatively outlined picture, uncontradicted in
substance, of the way he worked, the conditions under which he worked through the long
hours of overtime which built up that stress of
overexertion and weariness 9 and the physiological changes from unexpelled fatigue
poisons which brought on the coronary
occlusion.
Defendants have given the Court an
illustration of "conflict" based upon the
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-10witness who could not say that an object
was round 9 because it was too dark for him
to see. They apply that principally to the
medical testimony 9 but as to both fact and
medical testimony 9 we again submit: When
the other witnesses said the object was
round, it is not contradiction to say: "I
don°t know. I could not see it in the dark".
Men have the sense of touch which advises
of shape; those whose eyes have adjusted to
the dark see what the viewer 9 new come
from a lighted space, finds it impossible to
perceive. Conflict does not arise except
where the negative goes beyond mere want
of knowledge; it must be based upon something affirmatives it must "deny,oppose 9
assert the contrary," have substance and
not shadow. That the man whom Jones
helped load a truck saw "nothing unusual"
about him means nothing 9 unless his attention was directed towards the possibility.
He knew from his contact with the vinery
work what was going on there 9 he probably
expected men working such hours, under
such conditions to look tired- -that would
be "nothing unusual. "
A wall may be built of bricks of
different size 9 shape or color; there may
be intersices or broken mortar, but if it
stands and resists penetration 9 it's a wall,
and it does not fall from criticism of its
components or of the skill of the builders.
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To remove its effect as a barrier, it must
be opposed, battered, shaken by force,
pushed aside. The wall of fact we have here
stands; --a wall buttressed not only by the
psoitive testimony adduced, but also by the
admissions made by the canning company
when it put two men on to do what Jones alone
had been doing 9 when it tore out the sides of
the vinery to give freer passage to cooling
air; when it replaced the broken exhaust pipe
and found and corrected the conditions which
made the motor balky.
Before leaving this point 9 we direct
the attention of the Court to the fact that
defendants often push their statements as to
the testimony past the point of accuracy.
As three examples may we cite:
The statement (Br. on Reh. 23-35)
that Jones had some 5 1/2 hours of rest on
the night of July 2nd. The evidence ( T r. 3 334-35) 9 as we point out on page 23 of our
original brief 9 was that he had not been able
to sleep on either the night of the 1st or 2nd,
had lain in front of the door "for coolness",
without sleeping 11 until only some 2 to 3
hours before getting up to go to work at a
time when people normally are j1illst getting
started with their night's rest. Now counsel
say that the Commission was justified in
dinding that "in view of the fact that he had
had some five and one -half hours of rest the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12night before, albeit somewhat restless
because of the heat, he was not in the condition of fatigue necessary to the conclusions of Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson. "
(Deft. Br. 35). Nothing said of the fact
that he had p1J.ll.t in the normal work week of
40 hours in the three days just preceding,
nothing of the want of sleep the night before!
The statement (Deft. B r. 3 5) that his
work "on this particular day was no more
arduous and severe than normal during the
pea run. 11 True enough- -he only was on
the job some seven hours, a normal day's
work perhaps, before he sickened and
died. Nothing is said by defendants of the
piled up hours of exertion with little rest
lying behind that day 8 s work 9 --and that
situation was not "normal during the pea
run" when 11 as Plant Superintendent Weathers
testified (Tr. 177) 9 ttthere would be a rush
of work and some long hours and we advised
them (Jones and the other vinery foremen)
to arrange for two crews and some relief
for himself." Certainly Jones had had "a
rush of work and some long hours"·
The statement (Deft. Br. 21): "As a
matter of fact 11 other than that it was vsmall',
the motor isn't even described. 11 We have
in evidence a sketch and photographs showing the location of this "small" motor. It
was ''higher than the table" (Tr. 98) 30 to
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-1336 inches highp and of substantial ground
dimensions as shown by the photographs
of its position.. It was ''small" only in
relation to the larger motor.
Again: The medical testimony was
that the effect of fatigue and exertion upon
any given individual would vary, and that
no one can fix in advance the point :where
any individual would become suqject to
coronary occlusiono The te stirnony to that
effect is no more than expert verification
of what common sense would teach. 11 No one
in the whole worldl) including the dpctors 9
knows how much effort 9 how much fatigue,
how much emotional upset was necessary
to produce a coronary in this individual"
say defendants in this last brief (Pg. 38)
and that is not disputable. So, s~y defendants, to conclude that Jones died of a
coronary occlusion is merely an intelligent guess" 9 a supposition 9 and the Cornmission being bound to act only upon substantive evidence 9 not upon conclusions,
cannot be held to have acted arbitrarily.
Accept this reasoning 9 and there is
hardly an instance where judgments 9 de pendent upon expert evidence, could stand.
The logic behind the position the majority
opinion takes is practical, and runs something like this:
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First: The medical evidence is (and
common sense teaches us,) that for every
individual there is a breaking point, a time
when exertion and fatigue and other environmental fa.ctors 9 excessively prolonged, will
result in exhaustion of that individual's
reserves, and then a coronary occlusion is
one of the likely results.
Second: Jones 9 while exposed in a
high degree to conditions naturally causing
fatigue and overexertion 9 and which were
prolonged for an excess period of time,
suffered a coronary occlusion, and the evidence affords no explanation of that occurrenee except that it resulted from the
recited conditions.
Third: Jones n death was so industry
connected as to be compensable.

er

This reasoning is along the lines of
res ipsa loquitur 9 perhaps. But it is the
reasoning which runs through every case
where an award has been made as the result of a coronary occlusion. In no such
case that we have read and 9 we venture to
say 9 in no case appearing in the books, has
any per son, expert Qr otherwise te stifled
to the degree of fatigue 9 or exertion 9 or
stress, or emotion 9 which necessarily the
injured man must sustain before a coronary
resulted. In no case is it possible! Nor
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-15is it necessary! The proof necessary to
e sta.blish the connection between the
cardiac failure and the overexertion is
defined in a quotation appearing on page 34
of our original brief, taken from
Hammond v. Ind. Co. - 84 Utah 67
34 P. Zd 687
"Nor is it necessary that such consequence be shown by direct and
po~itive testimony. It rna y well be
shown by facts and circumstances
which fairly and reasonably point
to such result and to the exclusion
of any contrary result equally deductible from the proven facts and
circumstances. 11
We submit that the evidence as to the
environmental factors, the working conditions which preceded death in this case,
stands without any substantial contradiction; that there is nothing in the record
intrinsically discrediting it 9 that he was
convincing and sustained the burden of
proof 9 and that it should have been followed.
To quote a part of Morris v. Ind. Com.
(Supra) not found in defendants 1 brief:

"If the Commission should decide
against the uncontradicted evidence
under the conditions, its dec is ion
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-16would as a matter of law be arbitrary and capricious, which is
another way of saying that it would
be unreasonable. "
Point No. 2. Is it the law, as defendants assume 9 that the power of determining what the evidence shows is solely
within the field of the Commission?
The Commission so asserts in its
opinion, and the defendants support it.
The following excerpts illustrate the position taken:
The Commission:
"The only is sue to be resolved is
the cause of the occlusion. Was
it the result of an accident arising
out of and in the course of employment? We think it was not. In the
determination of that question the
responsibility is upon us to determine the ultimate fact. " (Emphasis
ours.)
The Defendants:
(Br. on Reh. 9) "Whether those
facts exist or not is for the Commission to determine. ---The question then bee orne s, not whether the
Commission
was arbitrary in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-17declining<to accept the doctors'
conclusions 9 but whether it was
arbitrary in failing to accept,
as established in law, those
facts upon which the doctors premised their conclusions. "
This is to say, while the Commission
may be bound by expert testimony 9 uncontradicted and based on sound reasoning 9 it
may refuse to accept as true the evidence,
equally uncontradicted, equally strong, as
to the environmental conditions present 9
and by so doing, in however arbitrary or
unreasonable a manner, negative the testimony of the experts 11 and escape beyond the
restraining hand of this Court.
This argument then is carried on to
the absurd by the contention that the
majority opinion denies the Commission
power to find what the facts are as to
effort 9 fatigue and stress, and by so doing 9
in effect 11 holds that "where a coronary
occurs while an individual is at work, it
will be conclusively presumed to be industry connected. "
There is no rule of law which makes
sacrosanct a finding which is contrary to
the great weight of uncontradicted fact 9
and the power of the Commission to pass
on facts, as this court has repeatedly held,
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-18is limited to findings thereon which are
not unreasonable 9 and so not arbitrary.
This case presents no new theory of
liability. Industry will be required to pay
only when it subjects the employee to working conditions so severe as to result in
death or serious disability, and which are
beyond the normal work exacted of him 9
and to which he is accustomed. Given
proof of such conditions 9 which brings conviction to the reasonable mind 9 and proof
from those skilled in the ailments of the
body that those conditions were of a character sufficient to cause such death or
injury9 what public policy is disserved by
the decision in this case? Certainly not
the public policy which underlies the
Workmen's Compensation act--a policy
which requires industry to bear the burden
of industrial accidents, and removes that
burden from the workrn.an 9 and his family.
Factually the Jones case does not
lend itself to any such interpretation.
Here the employer itself contemplated
that such extraordinary hours of work
and sustained effort as brought about the
decedentus death were abnormal demands,
that they would necessitate relief for the
man performing the job; and itselfremedied the other conditions which made
the task so onerous. Yet as we have
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-19pointed out, the Commission dismissed
all this and the other evidence with the
assertion that

"If we believe all that evidence we
must conclude that deceased was
not subjected to any of these factors in a degree materially in
excess of the exertion, etc., to
which all individuals in every walk
of life or at home are subjected."
And

"There is no evidence of exertion
or fatigue. "
Certainly the Commission's position does not correctly reflect the law as
found in the cases of
Hammond v. Ind. Com. {Supra)
Robertson v. Ind. Com. - 109 Utah 25
163 p. 2d. 331
Dee Memorial Hospital v. Ind.
Com.
104 Utah 51;
138 p. 2d. 233
In two of those cases 9 this Court reversed
the Commission upon the ground that its
decisions did not give effect to the uncontradicted testimony and the reasonable inferences therefrom; in the latter 9 . its discusSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-20sion of the evidence clearly indicates
that it did not consider the Commission's findings as binding.
The fact is that the Commission
here has sought to find its way arou..nd
decisions of this Court which are not
palatable to it. By the pretense of finding the ultimate fact, it ignores the
decisions of the Court. The Commission
concludes that the coronary occlusion
here occurring was "not the result of an
accident arising out of or in the course
of his employment" seeking such such
language to avoid the effect of the
Hammond, Robertson and Dee Hospital
cases, which have held cardiac failure,
contributed to by the conditions and
activities of decedent within the course
of his employment, to be an acciden~.
It then goes on and says:

ttif the occlusion is determined
to be an accident, we find that
the employment had nothing to
do with the occlusion. "
Previously it had said that the
theory of this case was that:
"All of the surrounding circumstances over a period of two or
three days might have contriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21buted to the occlusion. This
theory would charge every
employer with every occlusion
(and other ailments) occurring
on the premises during the hours
of employment, and for that
matter occlusions and other ailments which occur off the prem.ises before or after the hours
of em.ploym.ent if not too remote
in point of time . rt
It is not for the Commission to say

whether or not the law charges the employer with any such liability. I£ 9 as this
Court has found 9 both here and in its prior
decisions, it is the law that injuries from.
prolonged effort 11 stress and strain are as
compensable as injuries from. immediate
great effort, stress and strain, the Commission's statement is an attempt to find
as fact or conclusion of law matter not
within its purview. That the law is as
stated 9 see our original brief 9 pages 39 to
42 inclusive.
Plaintiffs submit that the limits of
the authority of the Commission have been
well stated in the opinion of the majority of
this Court, where Justice Crockett says:

"If the Commission could go so
far as to refuse to believe this
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-22evidence, in the absence of anything of substance to refute it,
then it certainly would possess
arbitrary powers with no effective review left available to the
litigant" 11
Believing that the prevailing opinion
correctly finds that both factual and opinion evidence are such that the Commission
acted unreasonably in refusing to find for
the plaintiffs thereon; and that in so doing, ·
the Commission is not able to cloak its actions in any shroud of sanctity 9 we ask
that rehearing in this cause be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Dobbs and Dobbs
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By

STUART P. DOBBS
Of Counsel
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